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MUST WOLTERSTORFF SELL HIS HOUSE? 
David B, Fletcher 
In his recent book, Until Justice and Peace Embrace, Nicholas Wolterstorff claims that 
in ethics there exist "sustenance rights," also called "positive rights," which demand that 
people be provided the requirements of productive social living, including food, clothing, 
shelter, healthful environments, and elementary health care. I defend Wolterstorff's claims 
against attacks by social theologian Richard John Neuhaus, who argues in effect that to 
grant sustenance rights implies both personal and theoretical acceptance of an unreasonable 
obligation which I call the Duty of Sacrifice (DOS) to transfer all one's wealth to meet 
those needs, a charge which Wolterstorff interprets as a demand that he sell his house. 
In his recent work, Until Justice and Peace Embrace, 1 Calvin College philosopher 
Nicholas Wolterstorff explores a variety of issues, including Church social teach-
ing, contemporary global economics and power politics, liberation theology in 
comparison to Dutch neo-calvinism, epistemology, God's relation to time, and 
liturgical renewal, among many other topics. I would like here to restrict my 
remarks to an important and controversial claim that he makes about rights, 
which has been attacked in a severely critical review article in the journal This 
World by Lutheran clergyman and social theologian Richard John Neuhaus2 and 
defended by Wolterstorff in a lively response to this review published in the 
Reformed Journal.' 
While Neuhaus and Wolterstorff, and other thinkers whom they represent, 
disagree fundamentally in their understanding of what constitutes a just society 
and the Christian's role therein, the particular aspect of their disagreement that 
I would like to examine is Wolterstorff's assertion and Neuhaus's denial of the 
claim that within morality there exist "sustenance rights," also called positive 
rights by many theorists, along with the less controversial noninterference, or 
negative rights. 
Wolterstorff argues that we have at least four kinds of rights: rights to protec-
tion, from assault for example; rights to freedom, as to free speech; rights to 
participate in the political proc~ss; and rights to sustenance,4 This latter right to 
sustenance represents, in Wolterstorff's words, "a claim on our fellow human 
beings to social arrangements that ensure that we will be adequately sustained 
in existence,"5 Wolterstorff includes among the goods we are authorized to claim 
under these rights the following: "food, clothing and shelter that are adequate 
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for sustaining health and making it possible to contribute to society; ... water and 
air that are not injurious to health, and ... elementary health care."6 In a just 
society, the provision of such needs at this minimal level for everyone will be 
vi(wed as a matter of respect for basic human rights. Wolterstorff considers the 
en1itlement to the necessities of adequate sustenance "among the minimal claims 
that all of us make on our fellow human beings." 
Jf this assertion of sustenance rights is to be more than a mere manifesto, we 
must be able to specify the sorts of claims that people are entitled to make under 
these sustenance rights. Such rights share certain characteristics with rights in 
general. According to Wolterstorff, a right is "(1) ... a morally legitimate claim 
that (2) the actual enjoyment of that good (3) be socially guaranteed against 
ordinary, serious, and remediable threats. "7 For Wolterstorff, and for Henry Shue 
whose book Basic Rights inspires much of his account, a right places real and 
substantive obligations on others of three kinds: "(1) duties to avoid depriving 
people of the good in question, (2) duties to help protect them from deprivation, 
and (3) duties to aid the deprived in the event that deprivation does occur. "R 
FulJy satisfying the moral claims that rights impose on others requires more than 
merely refraining from engaging in acts which would constitute violations. 
Wolterstorff stresses that to refer to a claim upon a good as a "right" is to 
imply that the claimant is entitled to the good itself, not merely to a promise or 
a legal proclamation that affirms one's right to the good. That point can be 
summarized by saying that any genuine right is a "right to a good," not a "right 
to a right." Further, and this is important to his account and to my defense of 
it, to maintain that someone has a right to a good demands that a social guarantee 
be constructed for the right. A right not to be beaten, injured, raped, or killed 
place the burden on the social institutions in which the rightholder finds herself 
to take steps to see to it that she is not beaten, injured, raped, or killed. 
So, Wolterstorff adds rights to the basic necessities for human life and action 
in the world to the less controversial rights to noninterference. Now what is 
there to object to in all of this, which bears, after all, the pedigree of such a 
document as the "United Nations Declaration of Human Rights?" The doctrine 
of sustenance rights is philosophically controversial for reasons we shall inves-
tigatt.!, but it is nonetheless surprising to hear Neuhaus refer to Wolterstorff's 
advocacy of them as a "moral laceration" which is "cruel, but unfortunately not 
unusual, punishment for ... all of US."9 
What is at issue between the two? Wolterstorff has said that the refusal of "a 
rich man" to provide sustenance for a person who is starving "violates the starving 
person's rights as surely and reprehensibly as if he had physically assaulted the 
sufferer," a conclusion which he expects to make us all "uncomfortable."10 In 
his response, Neuhaus seems to ignore that Wolterstorff had included all of us 
among the uneasy rich who fall under the obligation; he had claimed that all of 
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us are rich in "global terms. "11 Neuhaus then concludes that to accept this doctrine 
of sustenance rights is to commit ourselves to the obligation to use our "power 
to transfer. .. our personal wealth to starving people-all of it and right now," 
which presumably a sincere Wolterstorff would already have done.'2 
For the purpose of discussion, I would like to construe Neuhaus's concerns 
as an argument, and then evaluate this Neuhausian argument vis-a-vis Wol-
terstorff's case for sustenance rights. I will not attempt the entire, formidable 
effort of giving a complete proof for such rights, but I hope to show that 
sustenance rights follow from the justifications generally offered for rights in 
general. Secondly, I suggest that the objections raised to sustenance rights in 
particular are not convincing. 
To begin then, let us call this duty which Neuhaus regards as correlative to 
sustenance rights the Duty of Sacrifice, or DOS. The DOS, which requires us 
immediately to give all of our personal wealth to those whose sustenance rights 
are not being satisfied, is obviously unreasonable as a demand of moral duty, 
failure at which is to constitute an injustice. Sacrifice perhaps more readily falls 
into that category often called the supererogatory. So, for any person to fail to 
meet the DOS cannot be plausibly interpreted as to violate others' rights. Thus, 
the sustenance rights to which the DOS corresponds must be rejected. In his 
response to the criticisms in Neuhaus's review, Wolterstorff plausibly interprets 
Neuhaus as having subjected Wolterstorff to "ridicule for not having sold [his] 
house in Grand Rapids and sent the money to the starving of the world,"'3 an 
omission to which Wolterstorff readily admits. 
Neuhaus can be interpreted as having set up a dilemma: either we accept the 
DOS, obligating us to give all of our resources to fulfill the sustenance rights 
of others, or we must reject that there are sustenance rights at all. Since Wol-
terstorff has evidently not accepted the DOS in his personal life, he must either 
tackle the one hom of the dilemma and rectify this situation immediately or else 
be impaled on the other hom and forfeit his doctrine of sustenance rights. The 
question of our title greets us: must Wolterstorff sell his house? 
The resolution of this question leads us to examine the dilemma I am attributing 
to Neuhaus. Is there reason to accept it? Well, Neuhaus is in fact in good 
philosophical company in rejecting sustenance rights for reasons related to those 
we have attributed to him. A right is thought of as being either negative or 
positive. If it is negative, it is in Tom Beauchamp's words "a right to hold a 
belief, to pursue a course of action, or to enjoy a state of affairs without inter-
ference," while if it is positive, it is a right "to obtain a good, opportunity, or 
service."'4 Jan Narveson sees negative rights to imply correlative duties "not to 
prevent, or interfere with," that to which we are said to have the right, and 
distinguishes negative and positive rights as the difference between "the right to 
nonhindrance and the right to help."15 For many philosophers, noninterference 
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or negative rights are relatively uncontroversial, because they safeguard important 
values at low cost, requiring only that other agents refrain from interference; 
while sustenance rights demand positive action and thereby encounter theoretical 
difficulties. 
Joel Feinberg argues that although negative rights are genuine, "positive rights" 
are not, strictly speaking, rights at all, because of the following distinction. 
Although negative rights impose upon me "duties towards hundreds of millions 
of people," they being negative, are such that "1 can discharge them all at a 
stroke by minding my own business."16 Positive rights like those to sustenance 
are' different. These rights require that actions be taken to insure that they be 
fulfilled, and to effectively fulfill them requires more than can reasonably be 
expected. Feinberg argues that while "young orphans may need good upbringings, 
balanced diets, education, and technical training everywhere in the world," he 
would not admit them a right to these goods because the scarcity of the goods 
in question makes it "impossible to provision all who need them. "17 
Feinberg's notion of correlativity of rights and duties implies that there can 
be no right without a corresponding duty that it is reasonable to expect to see 
fulfilled, and there now can be no duty that it is at present impossible to fulfill. 
Duties arise, along with their corresponding rights, when we find ourselves in 
a position to perform them. 
I believe Feinberg to be incorrect in his insistence that sustenance rights pose 
for us duties too stringent to be performed. To take the "high road" response, 
so to speak, we could quite well satisfy those corresponding duties if we were 
to accept the DOS. If we were to sell all of our goods, it would be possible to 
meet the requirements of the duty that corresponds to the right to sustenance as 
held by the needy. To take the less strenuous path, I will argue below that the 
duties imposed by sustenance rights are indeed in our power to fulfill with much 
more modest sacrifices. 
It is not that Feinberg is in any way indifferent to the needy, however. I should 
mention that he is willing to grant a "special 'manifesto' sense of right" by which 
natural needs can be seen as potential rights, rights becoming actualized when 
someone comes into position to grant them. 18 Similarly, Beauchamp argues that 
"rights are guiding ideals, rather than existing entitlements," and sees the term 
'right' as "a commendable or perhaps obligatory target, but not. .. a specific 
obligation."19 Returning to Wolterstorff, he would not be satisfied with this 
attenuated and rhetorical sense of sustenance rights, since he clearly requires 
that a right be more than a promise. 
A noted philosopher of rights who takes his stand on the same side of this 
issue as Wolterstorff is Alan Gewirth, who argues that sustenance rights are 
genuine entitlements to what purposeful agents need for action. Jan Narveson 
has raised objections to Gewirth's positive rights thesis that are relevant to 
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Wolterstorff as welU" Narveson charges positive rights with at least two major 
defects compared to negative, noninterference rights, on the basis of which 
Narveson denies that there are such sustenance rights. First, Narveson claims 
that positive rights would conflict with negative rights, since fulfilling positive 
rights would entail limitations on negative rights. If full negative rights were 
granted, positive rights would fade away. My right to lounge unhindered on the 
beach, to use Narveson's example, entails that a drowning person nearby can 
have no right to my aid, although it would be no doubt good of me to help her. 
Problems with negative rights aside, the positive rights thesis is secondly seen 
to be fraught with a set of internal problems; in Jan Narveson's words, "of course 
positive rights may give rise to conflicting duties: my duty to help the poor can 
conflict with my duty to heal the sick"21 or, we may add, with that to shelter 
my family, or to use an example from Wolterstorff, relieve urban blight with a 
Calder statue. By contrast, a "pure theory of negative rights" would in no obvious 
way give rise to such conflicts, since in language echoing Feinberg's, Narveson 
observes that "in general, at least, negative rights impose duties which can be 
fulfilled by doing nothing whatever. "22 
Narveson's claim that the dubious positive rights would conflict with the more 
firn1ly grounded negative rights is incomplete as a criticism of positive rights, 
since even negative rights properly understood impose positive duties that may 
conflict with one another and with those of positive rights. I will argue this 
contention below. 
Neuhaus's position, at least as we have reconstructed it, is dignified by much 
good philosophical company. If there are sustenance rights, these would evidently 
be positive and thus would require more of us than duty can demand. So to 
affirm the DOS and say that failure to transfer all of our goods to the starving 
is "morally tantamount to physically assaulting" the poor, as Neuhaus charges 
Wolterstorff with saying, would go too far. Sustenance rights must then be given 
up. 
Nonetheless, I believe Wolterstorff's endorsement of sustenance rights to be 
correct. I will make a number of points in his defense, and then conclude with 
a move I believe is crucial to the defense of sustenance rights, the undermining 
of the alleged fundamental distinction between positive and negative rights. First, 
it is perhaps worth noting that Wolterstorff does not claim that the rich man's 
failure is "morally tantamount" to assault; he says rather that to know of someone 
who is starving, to "have the power" to alleviate this starvation, and to choose 
to do nothing is to violate his sustenance rights. 21 The main point of this is to 
show that alleviating poverty is not a matter of optional charity, but of respecting 
human rights, and thus is obligatory. Since he never claims, and would in fact 
deny, that all of morality is reducible to the fulfillment or violation of rights, 
failure to provide sustenance is not necessarily morally tantamount to assault for 
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him. Failure to help is as much a violation of right, but may nonetheless be 
morally distinguishable from assault (e.g., it may not be accompanied by morally 
objectionable attitudes that may be supposed to contribute to the moral odiousness 
of assault). 
Second, there may be a difference in our culpability in violating negative and 
positive rights. If negative rights are primarily (although not solely) respected 
by refraining from action, they largely would involve what have been called 
"perfect obligations," those always in our power to fulfill, and thus involving 
more blame if violated, than would failure to undertake positive, "imperfect," 
and perhaps sacrificial actions to respect sustenance rights. If I have assaulted 
someone, he is clearly the victim of my violation of his right, whereas an 
unspecified large number of persons are responsible when someone suffers from 
starvation. 
Third, Wolterstorff does have exceptions built into his requirements for fulfil-
ling sustenance rights. In his Reformed Journal response, he claims that he has 
stated 
"more of them than the reader would care to hear about now. One has 
to know about the starvation or aggression, one has to be able to do 
something about it, one's doing something about it must not override 
IJther more pressing moral obligations, and so forth."24 
I think that all but the last qualification are easy to find in the book, and that 
last does seem to be an important one. He perhaps meant it to be understood as 
included in the qualification that the agent must "have the power" to aid. Perhaps 
we can accept that "having the power" to alleviate suffering involves ability to 
do so without overriding other important considerations, including keeping a 
roof over one's family's heads, providing for one's children's education, keeping 
ellough resources to enable one to perform one's job, supporting one's parish, 
and so on. Of course, the notion of overriding needs a great deal more specification 
in order to be of use, and in particular, to protect Wolterstorff's real estate 
investment. 
Fortunately, those who speak of duties to provide others with necessities have 
found ways to avoid committing themselves to the DOS. Limiting principles 
have been proposed. Alan Gewirth argues that we are obligated to provide for 
the needs of others up to the point in which it involves "no comparable cost to" 
our own needs for action.25 Peter Singer argues for an obligation to provide for 
human need that makes reference to the principle of beneficence rather than 
sustenance rights; he would have us sacrifice when necessary "to prevent some-
thing bad" up until the level when doing so would involve our "sacrificing 
anything of comparable significance."26 Since the thing to which we are to 
compare our sacrifice is others' lack of basic necessities, Singer would have us 
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accept a milder, modified DOS. Even under his stringent requirements we need 
not give "everything, all at once," as per Neuhaus's requirement, but nonetheless 
Singer would have us give a great deal of what we have that keeps us above 
that level of subsistence not presently enjoyed by our would-be recipients. 
Wolterstorff is probably closer to Gewirth than to Singer on the extent to 
which sacrifice is required. As Gewirth recognizes better than Singer, our own 
lives of action, our own projects, are also worth moral consideration. This point 
can be developed to help Wolterstorff avoid the DOS horn of Neuhaus's dilemma. 
The positive rights advocate can insist that it is simply not the case that our one 
overriding duty is always to fulfill the sustenance rights of the least fortunate. 
That is an important duty, to be sure, and few of us can claim to have met our 
requirements in this area. Nonetheless, our lives are more broadly to be charac-
terized by a stewardly concern for meeting the responsibilities of the various 
vocations to which we are called: parent, scholar, citizen, friend, churchperson, 
etc. Fulfilling all of these legitimate callings in any sort of balanced way requires 
trade-offs; I cannot do all I might do in directly aiding the hungry and still keep 
the rain off of my own family and fulfill my responsibilities to my employer. 
I will now turn to my major point on behalf of the sustenance-rights thesis 
and against its critics, that the alleged sharp distinction between positive and 
negative rights is not at all clearly delimited, and that if there are any rights at 
all they must include sustenance rights as well as the more widely recognized 
rights to liberty and security. 
First, whatever justification can be given for so-called negative, or noninter-
ference rights, would also establish the more controversial sustenance, or positive 
rights. So, to accept noninterference rights commits one in principle to accept 
sustenance rights. Philosophical accounts of rights, while varied in many respects, 
generally agree on certain fundamental points. Philosophers such as Richard 
Wasserstrom, Gregory Vlastos, Joel Feinberg, Thomas E. Hill Jr., E.M. Adams, 
Herbert Morris, and Alan Gewirth claim that morality contains human rights 
that apply equally to all persons. Persons have these rights, it is maintained, 
primarily to guard their freedom, safety, and well-being. These rights are neces-
sary to enable us to "secure, obtain, and enjoy" the goods that we need to live 
a truly human life, a way of life selected by us in accord with our own values, 
desires, and interests. To be able to live such a life is seen to be of extremely 
great value. This is why respect for rights traditionally is seen to be closely 
connected to respecting human dignity. 
If rights are justified by the fact that they secure conditions necessary for 
living a truly human life, what are these conditions? According to many philos-
ophers, they are liberty, defined as freedom from hinderance as one goes about 
one's business, and well-being, not having one's person or property interfered 
with. But it is quite evident that no one could live a truly human life with no 
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re,ources other than restraints on others' assault. Alan Gewirth includes suste-
nance rights with the other less controversial rights because both sustenance and 
the other goods alike are necessities for what he tenns "agency," purposeful 
action in the world as human beings. We can no more fulfill our purposes if we 
are debilitated by starvation than if we are physically restrained. In his argument, 
which is too complex to discuss here, any prospective purposeful agent must 
admit as rights for others the generic requirements for action that she herself 
needs for her purposeful activity, that is, freedom and well-being, including 
sustenance. 27 Regardless of which specific justification is used to give philosoph-
ical grounding to rights, however, a problem appears for those who wish to 
support negative rights but deny positive ones. Such philosophers paradoxically 
endorse a theory of rights based on the role that rights play in securing the 
ne,:essity for truly human living, while they exclude from the right-protected 
goods the minimal requirements for living such a life. 
fhe second point of alleged difference between the two sorts of rights I would 
like to undennine is what we may call the "action-restraint distinction." This is 
the widely held view that noninterference or so-called negative rights require 
only that we refrain from interference with others' activities. This nicely minimal 
requirement alone attaches to negative rights, while seemingly staggering duties 
are borne in the train of positive rights. For this reason, Feinberg, Narveson, 
and others have been led to deny any positive right to sustenance. 
In his response, Wolterstorff alluded to what I take to be the answer to this 
objection. When chided by Neuhaus for failing to sell his goods in fulfillment 
of what we have called the DOS, W olterstorff responded by noting that there 
are other rights he accepts which he also has not gone about satisfying, e.g., he 
has not joined the Afghan rebels even though he grants that they have a right 
not to be victims of aggression. Wolterstorff is hinting that since all rights impose 
duties of nondeprivation, protection, and aid, even so called noninterference 
rights such as the right not to be assaulted impose positive duties on all. The 
provision of positive duties to negative rights powerfully eviscerates the distinc-
tion between positive and negative rights. Negative rights too call for doing as 
well as forbearance. 
Henry Shue, in the work Basic Rights cited by Wolterstorff, helpfUlly draws 
attention to the fact that "while it is possible to avoid violating someone's rights 
to physical security yourself by merely refraining from acting in any of the ways 
that would constitute violations ... it is impossible to protect anyone's rights to 
physical security without taking, or making payments toward the taking of, a 
wide range of positive actions."28 Thus, for security rights to mean anything at 
all, they will require investment in "police forces; criminal courts; penitentiaries; 
schools for training police, lawyers, and guards; and taxes to support an enonnous 
system for the prevention, detection, and punishment of violations of personal 
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security. "29 A great deal of positive action is involved in fulfilling the duties to 
protect and aid others in their actual enjoyment of the security to which they are 
said to have a right. An agent scarcely begins by mere nonviolation to fulfill 
such a paradigmatic example of a negative or noninterference right as that to 
security. 
Related to this we have Feinberg's claim alluded to earlier that there can be 
no sustenance rights because in practical terms, it is impossible to set up a system 
that would provide effective guarantees that their claims be satisfied. There can 
be no right to a minimal standard of health care, for example, because of the 
impossibility of restructuring the health care delivery systems, globally and 
nationally, that would be necessary to guarantee that right. I would suggest, 
however, that negative rights such as that to security fare no better. We have 
thus far been unable to prevent a great many assaults in our urban areas, and I 
doubt that there is any practical possibility that we will do a great deal better in 
the near future. Yet we do not wish to deny that no one really has security rights 
merely because we are unable to safeguard them; rather we redouble our efforts 
to fulfill these claims. Both security and sustenance rights call on us to take 
action to forestall what Wolterstorff called "ordinary, serious, and remediable 
threats"; we are not to conclude from the fact that we cannot completely satisfy 
everyone's moral claims that the claims are invalid. 
The action-restraint distinction can also be vitiated from the other side. Shue 
argues, as do Wolterstorff and others, that so-called positive rights to sustenance 
largely can be satisfied merely by restraint, by ceasing to do certain things we 
now are doing which deprive the poor of their basic needs. While rights to 
sustenance do involve positive duties to aid, they also involve a "type of action 
needed to fulfill them ... [which] is even more difficult to distinguish sharply from 
the action needed to fulfill security rights, "30 and that is to cease our own 
threatening of them. In large part, sustenance rights can be satisfied by providing 
people with means to self-help, or by ceasing to deprive them of such means, 
as W olterstorff recognizes. Indeed, much of Wolterstorff' s book is documentation 
of how we in the global economic "core," on his theory, contribute greatly to 
the poverty of others at the "periphery." Omitting from this discussion the details 
of the mechanism by which the poor are denied access to what they need, let 
me merely suggest that the positive right to sustenance is largely satisfied in 
ways usually seen as characteristic of noninterference rights. While I do not 
suppose that the sustenance rights thesis is unproblematic, I do hope to have 
suggested why if there are any rights at all they will include sustenance rights, 
and that no sharp positive-negative distinction by which sustenance rights are 
deficient can be sustained. 
An additional point: if sustenance rights are not accepted, there is a prominent 
and well-known philosophical case for a positive duty to help the poor that makes 
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no reference to rights at all. Peter Singer's famous argument in "Famine, Afflu-
ence, and Morality" alluded to earlier derives a duty painfully close to the DOS, 
in fact, from the claim that we have a duty to prevent an evil when we are 
capable of doing so without sacrificing something of comparable value, and the 
uncontroversial claim that suffering due to deprivation of basic needs is just such 
an evil. As suggested earlier, I think that such an argument needs to be corrected 
by a more fully orbed sense of our moral responsibilities as they relate to vocations 
and callings, but in any case, it seems that the rights-sceptic is not yet home free. 
Must Wolterstorff sell his house, on pain of being forced to give up his theory 
of sustenance rights? We have said nothing that would bear on the specific level 
of sacrifice he must actually endue to be faithful to his own view, but I think 
that it is safe to conclude that he may limit his sacrifice by what is necessary to 
fulfill such vocational responsibilities as teaching and writing books that are as 
personally and intellectually challenging as the one we have been discussing. 
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